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Abstract
Writing primarily in 2013, Alan Sears examines different aspects of the
international legal framework as to how freedom of expression over the In-
ternet may be protected. Even though the Internet has largely incorporated
the concept of freedom of expression from its inception, the need for such
protection has become increasingly evident. States around the world have
progressively cracked down on Internet speech, a trend highlighted by recent
events occurring during the Arab Spring. Alan thus focuses on the Middle
East when exploring how Internet governance may be shaped, and human
rights and trade agreements may be utilized, in order to make sure that the
freedom of expression over the Internet remains respected. He discusses the
advantages and disadvantages of the different frameworks, suggests pro-
posals for improvements, and argues for the importance of engaging with
different stakeholders in decision-making processes to better meet this end.
I Introduction
Just as we are beginning to see the power that free resources pro-
duce, changes in the architecture of the Internet—both legal and
technical—are sapping the Internet of this power. Fueled by a bias
in favor of control, pushed by those whose financial interest favor
control, our social and political institutions are ratifying changes in
the Internet that will reestablish control and, in turn, reduce innova-
tion on the Internet and in society generally.
—Lawrence Lessig1
The Internet has become a central and indispensable means of exercising the
right to freedom of expression and opinion. In many ways, the modern concep-
tion of the Internet has become almost synonymous with freedom of expression.
This is plainly not entirely true, given that there are countries that limit public
access to the Internet, such as China. Even states that have a better track record
respecting access have shown weakness when under pressure; this has been evi-
denced recently in Egypt and Turkey.
The Internet, from its inception and throughout its implementation, has been
largely unregulated. This has likely led to the principles of freedom that a large
portion of the world associates with the Internet today. On the other hand, many
states have taken the position that they need to have more influence on the pro-
cess, whether for purposes of streamlining the protocols for faster uptake, or for
more malicious reasons such as controlling the process and flow of information.
No single method or framework by itself may be sufficient to ensure the free-
dom of speech over the Internet. Consequently, this Note will explore a multi-
faceted approach focusing on using an international legal framework to protect
1 Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected
World 15 (2001).
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freedom of expression over the Internet, with a spotlight on the Middle East.2
The aim is to analyze procedures and structures relevant to this region, as op-
posed to presenting an exhaustive analysis of every method and paradigm that
may be employed. For instance, there are many other ways in which freedom
of expression over the internet may be preserved and protected domestically,
such as through net neutrality and intellectual property laws, legislation aimed
at limiting liability for intermediaries, or regulations that place restrictions on
surveillance and data retention, to name but a few.3 As this is a rapidly evolving
field, the approach discussed in this Note will need to adapt to the constantly
changing landscape.
After a brief introduction to the history of Internet in Part II of this note, Part
III looks at Internet governance and possible regulation (or lack thereof), and
how the growth of the Internet has introduced new issues regarding how states
have stifled speech. Part IV looks to human rights agreements and other treaty
arrangements as a method of enforcing, or at the least encouraging, freedom of
speech on the Internet. An overarching theme is the importance of incorporating
many different stakeholders into decision-making processes in order to preserve
the freedom of expression.
II A Brief History
What began as a defense project of the United States snowballed into something
much greater.4 Packet switching technology was theorized and created as an al-
ternative to circuits as a means of communication.5 In 1969, after much research
and testing, the first messages between computers were sent over ARPANET, the
precursor to the Internet.6 ARPANET was a single network with limited capac-
ity for expansion given the protocol it used for transmission.7 The Internet that
2 This issue is relevant across the entire world, and other locales will be touched upon as well.
However, limitations on freedom of expression over the Internet are particularly pervasive in the
Middle East—hence the focus on this region. The United States will also be heavily discussed, as it
is the birthplace of the Internet; many of the standards and norms still in use today were created in
the United States.
3 These methods, while just as important to freedom of expression, are outside the scope of
this paper as they are primarily enacted domestically. This is subject to change. Intellectual prop-
erty law is becoming increasingly internationalized, and how this interacts with freedom of expres-
sion and the Internet could, in itself, be a topic for an article. Net neutrality is headed in the same
direction—it has been framed (and recognized by the European Commission) as a policy objec-
tive, and the European Parliament recently passed a net neutrality law, subject to approval by the
Council of Ministers. See, e.g., Net Neutrality Law Adopted by European Parliament, BBC News
(Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26865869; Eur. Parl. Doc. TA-PROV
281 (2014), http://polcms.secure.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/a5a15cc1-1999-
4bff-a5ab-4dd572699bb9/att_20140616ATT85462-704162869106635421.pdf; Council Direc-
tive 2009/140/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37.
4 Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet (2012), http://www.
internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/Brief_History_of_the_Internet.pdf.
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we know today is built on the underlying idea of open-architecture networking,
which allows individual networks to choose the structure and network technol-
ogy to implement.8 The desire to connect multiple networks required a more
robust protocol, which resulted in the development of the Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) for the transmission and communication of
data, which is still in use today.9
III Regulation or Governance of the Internet
Currently, there is little regulation of the Internet. A hodgepodge of organiza-
tions performs different roles in this “regulation,” which may be more accurately
termed oversight, direction, or guidance. The control of the Internet’s technical
structure is in the hands of a collection of decentralized and apolitical organiza-
tions, which are primarily based in the United States. They typically fall under the
umbrella of technical governance, and are concerned with creating standards to
foster Internet growth while keeping it functioning properly.10 The other, newer
side of the coin is policy governance, which involves what happens on the In-
ternet and the direction in which the Internet develops.11 Technical governance
and policy governance do overlap.12
A Technical Governance
Most technical governance organizations operate under a multi-stakeholder ap-
proach. Many of the organizations have maintained this approach from early in
the development of the Internet. The multi-stakeholder approach is intended to
expand the range of contributors in order to receive input from diverse interests
and to consider how organizational decisions affect a wide array of differing
groups.13 The openness of the process increases the transparency of the process




10 WhoGoverns the Internet?, Glob. Partners & Assocs. 3 (2012), http://www.gp-digital.
org/wp-content/uploads/pubs/who-governs-internet_web2.pdf (describing the history of in-
ternet governance, issues with the current regime, as well as proposals for change).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Joe Waz & Phil Weiser, Internet Governance: The Role of Multistakeholder Or-
ganizations 5–6 (2012), http://siliconflatirons.com/documents/publications/report/
InternetGovernanceRoleofMSHOrgs.pdf. The authors argue that one should see two elements in
the multi-stakeholder approach: “(i) representation (or, at a minimum, openness to representation)
from a diversity of economic and social interests (and not limited to a single economic perspective),
(ii) a representational role for civil society, generally defined as relevant stakeholders other than
government and industry.”
14 U.N. Dev. Programme et al., Multi-Stakeholder Decision-Making, U.N. Dev. Programme
8 (2012), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Environment%20and%20Energy/
Climate%20Strategies/Multi-stakeholder%20Decision-Making_Sept%202012.pdf.
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The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is an open international commu-
nity of network designers, operators, vendors, and researchers that has helped
develop standards for Internet architecture.15 It is the engineering body that
makes many technical decisions about the underlying architecture of the Inter-
net, and it has a very open governing structure—anyone can join to contribute
and there are no membership fees.16 As such, the process by which the IETF de-
velops transmission standards and protocols (now including TCP/IP) has been
noted to be more transparent and democratic than governmental processes.17
Members of the IETF also helped create the Internet Society,18 which is a global
non-governmental organization dedicated to promoting the open and transpar-
ent development of the Internet.19 The Internet Society participates in many con-
ferences to support these values and helps to provide funds for the IETF.20
Another organization operating under the multi-stakeholder approach is the
nonprofit organization Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), which oversees the Domain Name System (DNS) and Internet Proto-
col (IP) addresses, among others.21 The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA), operating under a contract with the U.S. government, originally con-
ductedmany of these services, and ICANN later assumed these responsibilities.22
ICANN entered into an agreement with the predecessor of VeriSign, a for-
profit company under contract with the U.S. government, which now controls
the management of domains ending in “.com” and “.net.”23 As these domains
are used over the entire world, and are not country specific like “.co.uk” (United
Kingdom) or “.com.br” (Brazil), states have pushed formore centralized control
of these domains in light of United States v. Bodog.24 In Bodog, a Canadian
15 About the IETF, Internet Eng’g Task Force, http://www.ietf.org/about (last visited
Apr. 22, 2014). The IETF does not have a physical office and most of the work is accomplished
through email lists, although meetings are held three times a year.
16 Getting Started in the IETF, Internet Eng’g Task Force, http://www.ietf.org/
newcomers.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). The IETF is compromised of volunteers. Many times
the volunteers can perform work for the IETF as part of their job and are essentially “sponsored,”
but they are not a representative of their company and are viewed as individuals.
17 Olivier Sylvain, Internet Governance and Democratic Legitimacy, 62 Fed. Comm. L.J. 205,
207 (2010).
18 Vint Cerf, IETF and the Internet Society, Internet Soc’y (July 18, 1995), http:
//www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/ietf-and-
internet-society.
19 WhoWeAre, Internet Soc’y, http://www.internetsociety.org/who-we-are (last visited
Feb. 22, 2015).
20 Id.; see also Cerf, supra note 18 (describing the relationship between the Internet Society and
the IETF).
21 Welcome to ICANN!, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos., http://www.icann.
org/en/about/welcome (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
22 Id.
23 Andrew Couts, US Gov’t Claims Right to Seize Any .com Domain, Dig. Trends
(Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/us-govt-claims-right-to-seize-
any-com-domain.
24 See David Kravets, Uncle Sam: If It Ends in .Com, It’s .Seizable, Wired: Threat Level
(Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/feds-seize-foreign-sites/
all/1; see also Indictment, United States v. Bodog Entm’t Grp., No. 1:12-cr-00087-CCB (D. Md.
Feb. 22, 2012).
176 Notre Dame J. Int’l & Comp. L. [vol. 5:1
gambling website was seized by the U.S. government under a U.S. District Court
order.25 This is particularly disconcerting to other nations, as it sets the precedent
for the United States to seize foreign-operated domains in the future.26
ICANN remains controversial internationally, in part because it received its
mandate through aMemorandum of Understandingwith the U.S. government.27
While ICANN has attempted to distance itself from the government, and the
government announced it would end its unilateral supervision over the organi-
zation in 2009, a subagency of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the National
Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA), still retains final
approval over changes to the DNS root zone file.28 However, some analysts
do not find this troublesome, as the United States has not interfered even when
ICANN has authorized new top-level domain zone files contrary to the U.S. gov-
ernment’s stated opinions.29 Recent positive developments imply that the situa-
tion is headed in the right direction. The United States recently announced the
NTIA will cease its oversight function upon approval of a transition plan that
will “[s]upport and enhance the multistakeholder model” and “[m]aintain the
openness of the Internet,” among other qualifications.30 It also made clear that
the government “will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a
government-led or an inter-governmental organization solution.”31
As many of these technical governance institutions were founded or grew
with strong input from the United States, they often reflect ingrained American
ideas regarding the freedom of expression. The First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
25 See Indictment, supra note 24.
26 In addition to a First Amendment issue, there is likely a Fourth Amendment issue as well,
which is outside the scope of this paper.
27 Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and In-
ternet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Ad-
min. (Nov. 25, 1998), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/1998/memorandum-understanding-
between-us-department-commerce-and-internet-corporation-assigned-; Who Governs
the Internet?, supra note 10, at 4–7.
28 See Michael Froomkin, Almost Free: An Analysis of ICANN’s ‘Affirmation of Commitments,’
9 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech L. 187, 192–203 (2011) (discussing ICANN’s changing relation-
ship with the U.S. government). “The root zone file is the master definition for the DNS and contains
the authoritative list of top-level domains and the information needed to find the authoritative do-
main name servers for each domain name.” Id. at 193 n.17. The process in convoluted. ICANN has
a subsidiary, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which is under contract with the
U.S. government to administer domain names. When the IANA decides to make a change—such
as the addition of a new domain—it is sent to VeriSign, which is in control of the root zone file.
While VeriSign has been encouraged to cooperate with and follow ICANN/IANA instructions by
the U.S. government, modifications to the root zone file require approval from an authorized U.S.
government official in the NTIA.
29 WhoGoverns the Internet?, supra note 10. An example of a top level domain the United States
did not prefer to be authorized was the suffix ending with “.xxx” to be used for pornographic sites.
30 Press Release, Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., NTIA Announces Intent to Transition Key
Internet Domain Name Functions (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/
2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions.
31 Id.
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petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”32 To some extent, these
values are reflected in how the Internet was developed in its early stages—there
were purposefully no mechanisms built-in to allow central control.33 From a
freedom of expression standpoint, the early Internet was about as open as theo-
retically possible. However, not all states hold the same values or appreciate the
bottom-up multi-stakeholder approach.
B Policy Governance
The related and more recently-developed field of policy governance is still strug-
gling to truly get its feet off the ground, but movements have been made to-
ward the creation or designation of a centralized body to oversee Internet gov-
ernance.34 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Na-
tions (UN) agency for information and communication technologies. It is known
for propagating standards to facilitate telephone, mobile, satellite, and Internet
communications fluidly.35 Following an action plan put forward by the ITU,
the United Nations endorsed a two-phase conference held in Geneva in 2003
and Tunis in 2005.36 The purpose of the conference was the “building of a
people-centred, inclusive and development-oriented information society so as
to enhance digital opportunities for all people in order to help to bridge the dig-
ital divide;”37 one that is founded upon the principles of the multi-stakeholder
approach.38 One of the core issues addressed by this information society was In-
ternet governance,39 and the conference spawned a number of organizations to
work towards that end, including theWorking Group on Internet Governance,40
which was tasked with the responsibility to investigate possible methods of In-
ternet governance and tomake proposals for action by 2005.41 One of the results
was an annual multi-stakeholder conference.42 The Internet Governance Forum
32 U.S. Const. amend. I. These protections were officially extended to the Internet with the de-
cision in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
33 Simon Jeffery et al., When Was the Internet Invented? A People’s History of the Internet,
Guardian (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/interactive/2009/oct/
23/internet-arpanet.
34 Who Governs the Internet?, supra note 10.
35 Our Vision, Int’l Telecomm. Union, http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/vision.
aspx (last visited Dec. 26, 2012).
36 G.A. Res. 56/183, ¶ 2 (Jan. 31, 2002).
37 G.A. Res. 60/252, pmbl. (Apr. 27, 2006).
38 Id. ¶ 6.
39 World Summit on the Information Society, Declaration of Principles: Building the Information
Society: A Global Challenge in the New Millennium, ¶ 50 (Dec. 12, 2003), http://www.itu.int/
dms_pub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-WSIS-DOC-0004!!PDF-E.pdf.
40 See G.A. Res. 59/220, ¶ 8 (Feb. 11, 2005) (welcoming the creation of the Working Group on
Internet Governance and the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms).
41 World Summit on the Information Society, supra note 39.
42 See G.A. Res. 60/252, supra note 37, ¶¶ 7, 9 (welcoming the creation of the Digital Sol-
idarity Fund and inviting the creation of the Internet Governance Forum); What is the Internet
Governance Forum?, Internet Governance Forum, http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/2011/
press/Backgrounder_What_is_IGF_final.doc (last visited Feb. 22, 2015). The IGF was created
in 2006.
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(IGF) brings together stakeholders from government, industry, and civil society
to discuss the best ways to preserve the evolution of the Internet in a way that is
beneficial to everyone.43 While the decisions are non-binding, it has become one
of the leading forums on public policy issues related to Internet governance.44
The ITU also oversees the International Telecommunication Regulations
(ITRs), which is a treaty that was developed in 1988 to define the principles
for the provision and operation of international communication; it has not been
revisited until recently.45 In December 2012, the World Conference on Inter-
national Telecommunications (WCIT-12) convened to rework the treaty in the
hope of improving online access and connectivity.46 Even though the ITU has a
structure that loosely resembles the multi-stakeholder approach, in that it is the
only UN agency that has input from both states and private entities (including
companies, academia, and other regulators),47 only governments could put items
on the conference’s agenda.48 One of the proposals from Russia would increase
the ITU’s role in Internet governance and remove control from the decentral-
ized oversight currently implemented.49 Companies such as Google and other
entities and individuals have voiced their concern over such provisions, specif-
ically fearing that governments might use them in order to limit free speech.50
The Secretary-General of the ITU has downplayed these concerns;51 however,
the resulting impasse and failure of the conference to reach a consensus seem to
reflect differing ideas about the role ITU should take in the future.52
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Hamadoun I. Touré, U.N.: We Seek to Bring Internet to All, Wired (Nov. 7, 2012),
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/11/head-of-itu-un-should-internet-regulation-
effort/. This treaty was the result of the 1988 World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone
Conference (WATTC-88).
46 Id.
47 Overview, Int’l Telecomm. Union, http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/overview.
aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (noting that membership is comprised of 193 Member States and,
in addition, includes information and communication technology regulators, leading academic in-
stitutions, and about 700 private companies).




50 See Vinton Cerf, ‘Father of the Internet’: Why We Must Fight for its Freedom, CNN
(Nov. 30, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/29/business/opinion-cerf-google-
internet-freedom/index.html (arguing that governments are trying to use a closed-door meeting
in order to gain more control of the Internet, possibly to allow “governments to justify the censor-
ship of legitimate speech” or even cut off Internet access in their countries); see also L. Gordon
Crovitz, The U.N.’s Internet Sneak Attack, Wall St. J. (Nov. 25, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424127887324352004578136902821852508.html (asserting that “China, Rus-
sia, Iran, and Arab countries are trying to hijack a U.N. agency that has nothing to do with the
Internet.”).
51 Hamadoun I. Touré, ITU Sec’y-Gen., Opening Remarks of the First Plenary of World Confer-
ence on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12) (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.itu.int/en/
wcit-12/Pages/speech-toure2.aspx (noting, “WCIT is not about taking over the Internet. And
WCIT is not about Internet governance.”).
52 See Cyrus Farivar, The UN’s Telecom Conference is Finally Over. Who Won? Nobody Knows,
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The fears of a potential central body, such as the ITU, playing a policy gover-
nance role may be well founded.53 Perhaps stating the obvious, any body whose
primary constituents are states is likely to favor states. In the ITU’s constitution,
member states have the “right to stop, in accordance with their national law,
the transmission of any private telegram which may appear dangerous to the
security of the State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency.”54
More ominously, member states also have the “right to cut off, in accordance
with their national law, any other private telecommunications” for the same
reasons.55 With this in place, and were the ITU to take a more central role in
Internet governance, states may find their acts which limit the freedom of expres-
sion expressly condoned; policies may be negatively influenced as to affect users
of other countries.56 However, as we shall see, many states have not waited for
the Internet to be regulated by a central body to justify infringing rights through
the manipulation of the Internet.
C Internet Governance: Moving Forward
While this wide array of governing institutions and organizations seems compli-
cated and unintuitive, the Internet has continued to flourish under their auspices.
More voices are heard when Internet governance processes remain open. Closing
the doors and letting only states deliberate may result in agreements that favor
states concerning the freedom of expression.
What can be seen as a mostly positive development for Internet governance
came in the form of the “Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of
Internet Governance,” also known as the NETmundial conference, held in April
2014. This was a true multi-stakeholder conference,57 coming in the wake of
reports revealing the mass surveillance regimes in use today.58 While the end
Ars Technica (Dec. 14, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/12/the-uns-
telecom-conference-is-finally-over-who-won-nobody-knows/ (discussing differing views of
states in regards to Internet policy and regulation and why they may or may not have signed the
agreement; eighty-nine signed and fifty-five abstained or deferred).
53 See Pfanner, supra note 48 (discussing the conferences fraught with politics and commercial
concerns); see also supra text accompanying note 50.
54 Int’l Telecomm. Union Const. ch. 6, http://www.itu.int/net/about/basic-texts/
constitution/chaptervi.aspx.
55 Id. art. 34(2).
56 Jillian C. York, Opinion, Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Internet Governance, Al Jazeera
(Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/12/201212592631186992.
html.
57 Closing Session, NETmundial (Apr. 24, 2014), http://netmundial.br/wp-content/
uploads/2014/04/NETMundial-23April2014-Closing-Session-en.pdf. Out of the 900 people
who participated, 19% were from government, 20% were from the private sector, 23% were from
civil society, 10% were from academia, and 10% were from the technical community. Id. at 1.
58 Alexander Klimburg, Building a Pluralist Future for the Internet, Atl. Council (Sept. 2,
2014), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/articles/building-a-pluralist-
future-for-the-internet. After reports emerged—originating from Edward Snowden—that re-
vealed mass surveillance used by the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA), Brazil’s presi-
dent called for an “emergency meeting on the future of the Internet.”
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result was a non-binding statement that could have been more forceful in certain
areas, the conference is largely seen as a success, and potentially a model, for
more pluralistic Internet governance going forward.59
Despite this, in the end it may be that a greater threat comes from domestic
laws and directives than from privileging states in international negotiations.60
The novelty and uniqueness of the Internet has created some difficulties in re-
gards to regulation. As most of the technical governance bodies are only con-
cerned with the efficient functioning of the Internet, and there is no international
working body setting policy for the broader environment—much like what is
seen with domestic broadcast media—questions remain as to how much author-
ity states should be able to apply in regulating content.61
As a consequence, there are no clear guidelines, nor an established set of rules
and regulations, that govern takedowns or other enforcement measures regard-
ing domains. This is why some states, such as the United States and Libya, have
seized entire domain names,62 while others block their citizens from accessing
certain domains63—all done nearly indiscriminately.64 This lack of consensus
as to norms leaves a legal vacuum filled by states and companies left to self-
regulation.65
59 Id.; Closing Session, supra note 57. Among the stronger points of the statement are that
ICANN is to transition from U.S. quasi-control to globalization by September 2015, and the li-
ability of Internet intermediaries was agreed to be limited; on the other hand, surveillance could
have received a stronger reprimand and/or limitations, and net neutrality was not mentioned. As a
point of reference, Russia and India were not pleased with the final document, preferring a more
state-centered approach.
60 Id.
61 Andrew Puddephatt, The Importance of Self Regulation of the Media in Upholding Freedom
of Expression, UNESCO 16 (Feb. 2011), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001916/
191623e.pdf.
62 Indictment, supra note 24; RobinWauters, Trouble In Clever Domain Land: Bit.ly AndOthers
Risk Losing Theirs Swift.ly, TechCrunch (Oct. 6, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/10/
06/trouble-in-clever-domain-land-bit-ly-and-others-risk-losing-theirs-swift-ly
(discussing the Libyan seizure of one of their top level domains ending in “.ly”).
63 See Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Syria Blocks Facebook in Internet Crackdown, Reuters (Nov. 23,
2007, 4:54 PM EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/11/23/us-syria-facebook-
idUSOWE37285020071123; see also Ben Woods, UK ISPs Ordered to Block Pirate Bay website,
ZDNet (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/uk-isps-ordered-to-block-pirate-bay-
website-4010026040 (stating that private internet service providers, or ISPs, will block access to
domains as a result of a court order).
64 Andrew Couts, U.S. Gov’t Seizes 70 More Websites for Copyright Infringement—Not the
Digital Kind, Digital Trends (July 12, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/u-s-govt-
seizes-70-more-websites-for-copyright-infringement-not-the-digital-kind. This ar-
ticle detailed that domain seizures have occurred en masse recently. In this instance, sev-
enty domains were taken down at once when VeriSign complied with a court order after
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) identified websites selling counterfeit goods;
over a two-year period 839 domains have been seized in the United States. At the inter-
national level, the United States is effectively operating in a grey space in their seizure of
domain names. See also Pakistan Blocks Youtube, 20K Other Websites, Hindustan Times
(Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.hindustantimes.com/technology/BusinessComputing-Updates/
Pakistan-blocks-Youtube-20K-other-websites/SP-Article1-941449.aspx (detailing how
Pakistan has recently blocked 20,000 websites).
65 Puddephatt, supra note 61.
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D National Responses: Internet Growth and
the Suppression of Speech
Few people were able to predict the meteoric growth of the Internet and its
use. What began with only a few interconnected computers in 1969,66 grew
to 16 million users in 1995.67 Today, there are more than 2.9 billion users—
approximately 40% of the world population.68 Names of online companies and
social media sites, as well as their derivatives (such as “tweet” for Twitter), have
entered into the everyday lexicon of millions of people across the globe.69 From
a data perspective, growth has been explosive: More data was transmitted across
the Internet in 2010 than in all the previous years combined.70
As mentioned before, the emergence of the Internet from the United States
has in large part included the United States’ notion of freedom of expression.71
However, not all states adhere to the same principles expounded in the U.S.
Bill of Rights. States have thus responded in different ways to some of the chal-
lenges that result from the Internet and how it facilitates the rapid spread of
information. Many states across the world have worked to limit speech in order
to maintain control of their population. There are a number of different ways in
which this is accomplished. Where the state has tightly regulated Internet service
providers (ISPs) or central control of the autonomous systems (ASs) (in layman’s
terms, the main pipeline to the rest of the Internet), the government can block
certain content or, in more severe cases, shut down the Internet. As mentioned in
a footnote above, the United States has seized domains through court orders.72
In other instances, traffic is monitored and expression is limited through threats
or actual physical harm.
In 2010, the Egyptian entrepreneur and blogger Khaled Said was brutally
beaten to death by police after allegedly possessing evidence of police corrup-
tion.73 His death became one of the catalysts for the Egyptian Revolution that
was to follow during the Arab Spring.74 Human rights activists posted morgue
pictures of Said’s mangled face on Facebook and other social media sites; some of
66 Leiner et al., supra note 4.
67 Internet Growth Statistics, Internet World Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.
com/emarketing.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
68 Id.
69 A few examples are eBay, Facebook, and Twitter. See Ingrid Lunden, Analyst: Twitter Passed
500M Users In June 2012, 140M Of Them In US; Jakarta ‘Biggest Tweeting’ City, TechCrunch
(July 30, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/07/30/analyst-twitter-passed-500m-
users-in-june-2012-140m-of-them-in-us-jakarta-biggest-tweeting-city (discussing
Twitter’s user base breaking 500 million users worldwide, making it the second largest social media
site behind Facebook’s 1 billion users).
70 See Ben Parr, More Data Was Transmitted Over the Internet in 2010 Than All Previous Years
Combined, Mashable (Oct. 20, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/10/20/kirk-skaugen-web-
2 (referencing a speech given by Kirk Skaugen, President of Intel’s Architecture Group, at the Web
2.0 Summit).
71 See supra Section III.A.
72 See supra text accompanying note 64.
73 Khaled Said: The Face that Launched a Revolution, Ahram Online (June 6, 2012),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/43995.aspx.
74 Id.
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the groups that were created online helped spread the word and organize demon-
strations and protests.75 The government responded to this perceived threat early
in the Egyptian Revolution by shutting off the Internet to a vast majority of the
people, presumably through government pressure on regulated ISPs.76
It is not only in Egypt that bloggers and activists have been targeted by state
security forces for their actions online. In certain places, such as Libya and Syria,
citizen journalists were targeted and killed in attacks by government forces for
their work.77 Additionally, these Internet users often face attacks from non-state
actors, who have received implicit governmental approval for their actions. For
instance, a man who created an online group promoting atheism in Indonesia
was beaten by attackers who reported him to authorities—he was then prose-
cuted while the attackers went unpunished.78
It is more common for governments to limit expression in a less direct and
drastic manner. Most exercise a more precise control of information by block-
ing access to certain domain names or to particular networks that host content
contrary to their interests.79 For example, Syria has prevented access to Face-
book, among other sites, since 2007.80 Pakistan has blocked access to YouTube
and 20,000 other sites.81 China has banned many social media sites as well,
and has even blocked virtually all of Google’s services, including e-mail, for a
short time.82 Iran has slowed Internet access in order to control protestors but
has never fully blocked it.83 It is no surprise then that Syria, China, Cuba, and
Iran were recently rated as having the most restrictive practices relating to the
75 See Jennifer Preston, Movement Began With Outrage and a Facebook Page That Gave It an
Outlet, N.Y. Times (Feb. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/middleeast/
06face.html (discussing the background behind the Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said,”
which had more than 473,000 users shortly after the Egyptian Revolution started).
76 Larry Greenemeier, How Was Egypt’s Internet Access Shut Off?, Sci. Am. (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=egypt-internet-mubarak. Five of
Egypt’s major service providers shut their connections to the Internet at almost the same time,
cutting 93% of the population’s access to the Internet. Id. Such a tactic would likely not be
practically possible in more complex and distributed Internet ecosystems as those found in the
United States and Canada. Id.
77 Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2012: A Global Assessment of Internet




80 Oweis, supra note 63. Many other sites, including online newspapers and YouTube, are also
blocked. See Claire Duffett, Facebook, Banned in Syria, is Widely Used—Even by the Govern-
ment, Christian Sci. Monitor (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-
News/2010/1118/Facebook-banned-in-Syria-is-widely-used-even-by-the-government
(discussing how the use of Facebook and other sites has increased in Syria despite the ban through
the use of proxies and other workarounds).
81 Pakistan Blocks Youtube, 20K Other Websites, supra note 64.
82 China Blocks Access to Bloomberg and Businessweek Sites, BBC News (June 29, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-18648050; Frederic Lardinois, China Blocks Virtually
all of Google’s Web Services as 18th Party Congress Gets Underway, TechCrunch (Nov. 9,
2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/11/09/china-blocks-virtually-all-of-googles-
web-services-as-18th-party-congress-gets-underway.
83 Greenemeier, supra note 76.
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Internet.84
These restrictive practices are easier to implement in some countries than
in others. Internet users across the world connect through 30,000 autonomous
systems (ASs), with the majority of traffic flowing through fewer than 1,000
(many ASs are sublevels of other ASs).85 Ninety percent of China’s IP addresses
connect to the wider Internet through only four ASs, whereas ninety percent
of Russia’s addresses connect through one of thirty-six ASs—China thus has
far fewer points of control, and therefore requires less sophisticated filtering
mechanisms.86
More than forty countries around the globe limit what Internet users are
able to access online.87 Overall, restrictions on Internet freedom have increased,
although the methods of control are slowly becoming less visible.88 Some states
have enacted laws that limit freedom of expression over the Internet and prompt
the arrests of Internet users.89 It may come as no surprise then that freedom on
the Internet has also been strongly correlated with democracy—of the seventeen
nations found to experience a decline in freedom over the past year, only four
were electoral democracies.90 This suggests civil society is essential to keeping
states in check.
Blocking sites such as Twitter and YouTube is not very effective in deterring
anyone who is tech savvy. There are many ways to get around such measures,
which include using virtual private networks (VPNs), Tor (which keeps commu-
nication anonymous), or Twitter’s text service.91 In repressive situations, perhaps
the real danger lies in the resulting infringement of the right of access to informa-
tion:92 It limits the exposure of those using the services and effectively slows, or
84 See Freedom House, supra note 77, at 21.
85 Mapping Local Internet Control—Research Methods, Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/netmaps/methods.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2014); Hal Roberts
et al., Mapping Local Internet Control, Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y (2012), http://
cyber.law.harvard.edu/netmaps/mlic_20110513.pdf.
86 Mapping Local Internet Control—Research Methods, supra note 85. An Internet Protocol (IP)
address is a unique identifier for any computer or device on a Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP) network, such as the Internet.
87 York, supra note 56.
88 Freedom House, supra note 77, at 1. Not only have technological advances made repressive
practices harder to detect, but a less malicious form of oppression, the spreading of disinformation,
has rapidly increased in usage among states. Before, this practice was primarily used only by Russia
and China.
89 See Internet Censorship Law Raises Freedom of Speech Concerns, New Eur. (Nov. 3, 2012,
10:28 AM), http://www.neurope.eu/article/internet-censorship-law-raises-freedom-
speech-concerns.
90 Freedom House, supra note 77, at 2.
91 See Emily Siner, So You Want To Evade Your Country’s Twitter Ban? A Workaround,
NPR (Mar. 21, 2014, 3:57 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/
03/21/292393830/so-you-want-to-evade-your-countrys-twitter-ban-a-workaround; Jil-
lian York, Why Is Turkey Blocking Twitter?, Elec. Frontier Found.: Deeplinks Blog (Mar. 20,
2014), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/03/why-turkey-blocking-twitter.
92 The right of access to information is related to the right of freedom of expression and is en-
shrined in many international human rights documents. Relevant to this discussion, it is present in
some form in the documents discussed below including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Art. 19), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 19), the Arab Charter onHu-
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stops, the spreading of information—of abuses and violations of other human
rights. Those who proactively take measures to circumvent blockages to seek
this material most likely self-identify as anti-government, and thus will merely
be “preaching to the choir.”93 While it is important to mobilize and inform out-
side populations of abuses occurring in one’s country (so that outside countries
have incentives to place external pressure on the state, potentially through sanc-
tions or other measures), the true force of the information may be largely lost,
as lasting change is most often successful when it is driven from within.
E International Jurisprudence
Both regionally andworldwide, limitations have been developed on governments
restricting freedom of expression. While the standards examined in this section
are largely inapplicable to the Middle East region,94 they serve as persuasive
authority around the world.95
The “three-part test” has become a well-recognized international standard
on permissible restrictions on freedom of expression.96 Restrictions “must be
provided for by law in the clearest and most precise terms possible, pursue a
legitimate aim recognized by international law, and be necessary to accomplish
that objective.”97 In addition, the measures taken must be proportionate to the
man Rights (Art. 32), and the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (Art. 22). The scope of
the right varies between these documents. SeeG.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 19; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Arab Charter on
Human Rights, May 22, 2004 (entered into force Mar. 15, 2008), translated in Mohammed Amin
Al-Midani et al., Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004, 24 B.U. Int’l L.J. 147 (2006); Cairo Dec-
laration on Human Rights in Islam, art. 19, Aug. 5, 1990, translated in Translation of the CDHRI,
Org. of Islamic Cooperation, http://www.oic-oci.org/english/article/human.htm (last
visited July 19, 2015).
93 Charles Arthur, Turkish Protesters Using Encryption Software to Evade Censors, Guardian
(June 4, 2013, 8:29 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/04/turkish-
protestors-encryption-software-evade-censors.
94 This is with two exceptions. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains
a portion of the three-part test and has numerous state parties in the Middle East, and Turkey is
subject to the European Court of Human Rights and is considered by many to form a part of the
Middle East.
95 See Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, 19 Eur. J. Int’l L. 101, 109–22 (2008) (analyzing how the Inter-American Court
imports norms from the corpus juris of international human rights law and contributes back into
this system); Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgement, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123, ¶ 7 (Mar. 11, 2005) (separate opinion of Cançado Trindade, J.) (“The
work of the Inter-American and European Courts of Human Rights has indeed contributed to the
creation of an international ordre public based upon the respect for human rights in all circum-
stances.”). In addition, the European Court of Human Rights is binding on all forty-seven member
states of the Council of Europe and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is currently binding
on twenty-three out of the thirty-four active member states of the Organization of American States.
See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 (entered into force
July 18, 1978).
96 The three-part test is also known as the tripartite test.
97 Catalina Botero Marino (O.A.S. Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression), Freedom of
Expression and the Internet, ¶ 122, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.11/13 (Dec. 31,
2013).
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legitimate aim.98 The Inter-American Court on Human Rights has recognized
this standard.99 Freedom of expression has been held to be, particularly in rela-
tion to matters of public interest, “a cornerstone of the survival of a democratic
society.”100 The Court has further held that in such a society “the state institu-
tions or entities as such are exposed to public scrutiny and criticism, and their
activities are inserted in the domain of public debate . . . [h]ence larger tolerance
should face the affirmations and considerations made by citizens.”101 Addition-
ally, this increased level of tolerance of criticism of the state is not just limited
to institutions: “[T]he opinions regarding a person’s qualification to hold office
or the actions of public officials in the performance of their duties are afforded
greater protection.”102
Article 10 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights outlines the
right of freedom of expression, and § 2 delineates the three-part test.103 The
European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly recognized this rule,104 and
limitations on speech are interpreted strictly.105 Additionally, publication on the
Internet has been explicitly held to be covered by Article 10:
The Court has consistently emphasised that Article 10 guarantees
98 Id. ¶ 124.
99 E.g., Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, ¶ 120–23 (July 2, 2004); Canese v. Paraguay,Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111, ¶ 96 (Aug. 31, 2004); Kimel
v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 177, ¶ 58
(May 2, 2008); Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 207, ¶ 88 (Nov. 20, 2009).
100 Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 207, ¶ 47. The Court refers to its
jurisprudence established in numerous cases.
101 Id. ¶ 83.
102 Kimel v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 177, ¶ 86; see also Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa
Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, ¶ 128; Canese v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 111, ¶¶ 97–98.
103 Article 10—Freedom of expression
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be sub-
ject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of in-
formation received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950,
C.E.T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
104 E.g., Müller v. Switzerland, 133 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 29–31 (1988); Aleksey Ovchinnikov
v. Russia, App. No. 24061/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 44 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=
001-102322.
105 Eur. Court of Human Rights Research Div., Internet: Case-law of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 11 (2011) [hereinafter Case-law of the ECHR], http://www.
echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_internet_ENG.pdf.
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not only the right to impart information but also the right of the
public to receive it. In light of its accessibility and its capacity to
store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet
plays an important role in enhancing the public’s access to news and
facilitating the dissemination of information generally. The main-
tenance of Internet archives is a critical aspect of this role and the
Court therefore considers that such archives fall within the ambit of
the protection afforded by Article 10.106
Like the Inter-American Court, European Court of Human Rights case law
has also held that restrictions on political speech or matters of public interest
are held to a higher standard than regular speech and must be narrowly tai-
lored.107 Specifically in regards to political speech, the Court held in Sürek v.
Turkey (No. 1) that:
[T]he limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the gov-
ernment than in relation to a private citizen or even a politician. In a
democratic system the actions or omissions of the government must
be subject to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial
authorities but also of public opinion.108
In addition, Article 10 also applies to information or ideas that “offend, shock
or disturb the State or any sector of the population,” not just to those that are
received favorably or with indifference.109 The right is respected “regardless of
frontiers”—information received from abroad may only be restricted within the
limitations and justifications set forth by § 2.110
Even as these standards have already been held to apply to online expres-
sion,111 more cases will be heard specifically concerning freedom of expression
over the Internet as time progresses.112 Recently, in Yıldırım v. Turkey, a ban
106 Times Newspapers Ltd. v. United Kingdom (Nos. 1 & 2), 2009-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 377, 389
(citations omitted).
107 Willem v. France, App. No. 10883/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 33 (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-93612. However, one taking part in a public debate—for example—must respect
the rights of others, but a certain amount of exaggeration and provocation is permitted.
108 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1), 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 353, 383.
109 Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 49 (1976). This passage has also
been quoted directly in the Inter-American Court in the case of “The Last Temptation of Christ”
(Olmedo-Bustos) v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 73, ¶ 47 (Feb. 5, 2001), which was later referenced in a number of cases. See, e.g., Ivcher-
Bronstein v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74,
¶ 152 (Feb. 6, 2001); Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, ¶ 113 (July 2, 2004); Canese v. Paraguay,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111, ¶ 83 (Aug. 31,
2004); Kimel v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 177, ¶ 88 (May 2, 2008).
110 Cox v. Turkey, App. No. 2933/03, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 13, ¶ 31 (2010).
111 See Times Newspapers Ltd., 2009-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 377. See generally Case-law of the ECHR,
supra note 105, at 11–14; Botero Marino, supra note 97.
112 E.g., Delfi AS v. Estonia, App. No. 64569/09, 58 Eur. H.R. Rep. 28 (2013). Not all decisions
have been positive, however. For instance in this case, the news portal Delfi AS was held liable as
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of an entire online platform, which had the effect of preventing all access to
the applicant’s own website, was held to be an infringement of freedom of ex-
pression.113 This result has had a positive effect on domestic courts in Turkey,
whose government has made recent moves to censor certain sites. After protests
and security leaks, Turkey blocked both Twitter and YouTube.114 Shortly after-
ward, the Constitutional Court held that the Twitter ban had to be lifted imme-
diately.115 A month later, the same court held that blocking YouTube was like-
wise a violation of freedom of expression and individual rights, citing Yıldırım
v. Turkey.116 While certain Twitter accounts continue to be banned,117 this is a
step in the right direction.
The prevalence of these standards is not limited to regional instruments, al-
though there is more established case law within these systems. It should be
noted that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
that is to be discussed in Part IV, also has a form of the three-part test.
IV Treaties
Where does this leave us? Are there not binding international treaties in place
to protect human rights? There are, but as we shall see, the story does not end
here. Treaty enforcement mechanisms can prove inadequate, resulting in states
not being held accountable for their actions. Still, treaties remain a viable area
through which the freedom of expression over the Internet may be protected.
A Human Rights Instruments
Many of the states that currently limit freedom of expression over the Inter-
net are parties to binding treaties concerning human rights. In fact, every UN
an intermediary for an offensive comment posted by third-party user on its website, despite taking
down the offensive comment the same day it was notified of its existence.
113 Yıldırım v. Turkey, App. No. 3111/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng-press?i=001-115705. The entire Google Sites platform was banned because a site was held by
a national criminal court to be offensive to the memory of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who is credited
with founding the Republic of Turkey.
114 Gul Tuysuz & Ivan Watson, Turkey Blocks YouTube Days After Twitter Crackdown,
CNN (Mar. 28, 2014, 10:43 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/27/world/europe/turkey-
youtube-blocked.
115 Anayasa Mahkemesi [AM] [Constitutional Court] Apr. 2, 2014, No. 2014/3986,
http://www.kararlaryeni.anayasa.gov.tr/BireyselKarar/Content/472bbf6e-ce2c-
4c83-a402-6bdd44702537?wordsOnly=False, translated in Decision of the Constitutional Court,
Const. Ct. Republic of Turk. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/en/News/Detail/
judgment/2014-3986.pdf.
116 Anayasa Mahkemesi [AM] [Constitutional Court] May 29, 2014, No. 2014/4705,
http://www.kararlaryeni.anayasa.gov.tr/BireyselKarar/Content/e08bbc9d-6949-
4951-9bac-3b51ddf0004c?wordsOnly=False, translated in Decision of the Constitutional Court,
Const. Ct. Republic of Turk. (May 29, 2014), http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/en/News/
Detail/judgment/2014-4705.pdf. The Court said that the banning of fifteen specific videos
would be permissible, but the blocking of the entire site would constitute a violation of Article 26
of the Turkish Constitution (freedom of expression) and human rights.
117 Efe Kerem Sözeri, The Two Faces of Twitter, Bianet: English (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.
bianet.org/english/world/161972-the-two-faces-of-twitter.
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member state has ratified at least one of the nine core human rights treaties,
and eighty percent have ratified four or more.118 Some of these agreements only
cover certain fields of human rights,119 while others, discussed below, directly
contain provisions for the protection of freedom of speech.
Out of the experiences ofWorldWar II came the first widely adopted interna-
tional human rights-specific agreement.120 The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 and has be-
come the foundation for legally binding human rights instruments,121 some of
which are discussed below. Article 19 of the UDHR specifically guarantees the
right of “freedom of opinion and expression.”122
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
In order to give force to the right to freedom of opinion and expression, among
many others, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966.123
The ICCPR provides for similar protections, in Article 19, paragraph 2: “Every-
one shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of fron-
tiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
118 The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, United Nations, http://www.un.
org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). The nine core human rights
treaties are: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination (ICERD), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW), the International Con-
vention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED), and the Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). See The Core International Human
Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies, Off. U.N. High Commissioner for Hum.
Rts., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last
visited Nov. 15, 2014).
119 E.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984,
1465 U.N.T.S. 112; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, Mar. 7, 1966, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination, 660 U.N.T.S. 211; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, June 27, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
120 History of the Document, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
history.shtml (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). See generally G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, supra note 92.
121 The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, supra note 118. See generally G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 92.
122 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 92, art. 19
(“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers.”).
123 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 92.
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media of his choice.”124 Even though the Internet was likely not envisaged during
deliberations, it is implicitly covered under “any other media.”
However, paragraph 3 of the same article contains a broad exception autho-
rizing the restriction of speech. Paragraph 3 states:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore
be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.125
Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere have considered this
paragraph to exempt them from guaranteeing rights under paragraph 2.126 A
general comment from the Human Rights Committee in 1983 did little to clarify
this issue.127 It merely stated that this exception must be “provided by law,” jus-
tified as “necessary,” and “may not put in jeopardy the right itself.”128 In 2011,
the Committee issued another comment that replaced the 1983 comment.129 The
tone seemed to change from one of prescribing the limits of restricting speech to
one of prescribing how far the rights under Article 19 extend. For example, it
clarified that “[a]ll forms of opinion are protected, including opinions of a polit-
ical, scientific, historic, moral or religious nature.”130 Protections for freedom of
expression encompass a wide range of topics, from “political . . . and religious
discourse” to even material that may be considered “deeply offensive,” although
the latter is subject to restrictions under paragraph 3.131 In addition, what little
ambiguity existed as far as the Internet being a medium over which rights are
protected has been completely removed.132
Many states, such as the United States, took some time in ratifying the agree-
ment.133 While the force of this treaty may be watered down by some nations
124 Id. art. 19(2).
125 Id. art. 19(3).
126 See Naomi Sakr, Satellite Realms: Transnational Television, Globalization & the
Middle East 149 (2001).
127 Human Rights Comm., Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies 181–82, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. 1) (May 27,
2008).
128 Id.
129 Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Ex-
pression, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011).
130 Id. ¶ 9.
131 Id. ¶ 11. “Deeply offensive” material is the only form of expression that is explicitly mentioned
to be subject to paragraph 3’s restrictions.
132 Id. ¶ 12 (“They include all forms of audio-visual as well as electronic and internet-based modes
of expression.”).
133 See Jimmy Carter, US Finally Ratifies Human Rights Covenant, Christian Sci. Monitor
(June 29, 1992), http://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0629/29191.html (discussing how, as Presi-
dent, Carter signed the Covenant in 1977, it took another 15 years for the United States to ratify).
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that have attached reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs),134 it
is interesting to note that many of the worst offenders have not attached RUDs
at all.135 After ratification, states oftentimes continue on as before and merely
attached RUDs to excuse actions they knew would be in contravention of the
treaty; in other words, they were already close to complying with the treaty—
albeit with a few exceptions.136 On the other hand, many nations completely
disregard provisions in the treaties and make little effort in complying.137 The
prevalence of RUDs and the indifference of other states towards these instru-
ments at the very least shows that despite having such a widely ratified, binding
human rights treaty, disagreements persist as to which human rights are actually
valued.
Within the ICCPR framework lies the Human Rights Committee, a body of
independent experts from nations that have ratified the treaty, which monitors
compliance.138 States that have acceded to the treaty are obligated to submit re-
views every four years to the Committee, which in turn addresses its concerns
and recommendations in a “concluding observations” report.139 However, re-
ports from many state parties are long overdue,140 and when they are submitted
they tend to be descriptions of domestic law rather than a compliant report on
how the treaty is being implemented.141 The lack of a viable international en-
forcement mechanism to affect changes at the national level and the resultant
low cost of ratification may be what has induced many states with less than
stellar human rights records into participation.142
There is also an individual complaint procedure found in the Optional Pro-
tocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that allows
individuals to lodge comments or complaints on a wide range of human rights
violations, including the freedom of expression.143 Far fewer states are parties
to the First Optional Protocol compared with the original document: the Op-
tional Protocol has been ratified by 115 states (thirty-five signatories)144 while
134 See William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 Brook. J. Int’l L. 277, 280 (1995) (discussing the
unprecedented number of RUDs the United States has: five reservations, five understandings, four
declarations, and one proviso).
135 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 129 (2005).
136 See id. at 130–31. But see Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Power and Purpose of Inter-
national Law 121–23 (2011) (offering an alternative explanation for the driving forces behind
treaties).
137 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 135, at 130–31; see also Anne F. Bayefsky, The UN Hu-
manRights Treaty System: Universality at the Crossroads 7 (2001), http://www.bayefsky.
com/report/finalreport.pdf.
138 Carter, supra note 133; Human Rights Committee, Off. United Nations High Comm’r
Hum. Rts., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx (last visited
Feb. 22, 2015).
139 Human Rights Committee, supra note 138.
140 Bayefsky, supra note 137.
141 Id. at 22
142 Id. at 7.
143 Id.
144 Status of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, United Nations Treaty Col-
lection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
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the original has been ratified by 168 states (seventy-four signatories).145 Notable
non-signatories include the United States and many states in southern Asia, the
Middle East, and Africa that were parties to the original ICCPR treaty. Like the
original treaty, many states have attached RUDs.
The individual complaint procedure is used sparingly,146 although there may
be a number of factors contributing to this phenomenon. It is likely in part due to
the lesser number of parties to the agreement, as well as the fact that many RUDs
were attached to not allow retroactive use of the Protocol (i.e., only claims con-
cerning events that occurred after the Protocol went into force may be brought
under the complaint procedure).147 Another cause, at least among many Eu-
ropean nations, is that they included a RUD that disallows the procedure to
be used when the same case has already been “examined under another proce-
dure of international investigation or settlement.”148 A further reason is that the
complaint procedure does not carry much weight. In order to bring a claim, the
individual must have exhausted all domestic remedies.149 When an individual is
able to bring a claim, the Committee only issues “views,” even though the body
sits much like a court.150 These “views” are non-binding and rely on the duty
of the state to “act in good faith” to cooperate with the Committee and provide
an appropriate remedy.151
2 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI)
Even thoughmany Islamic nations voted in favor of the UDHR and subsequently
signed and ratified the ICCPR, they simultaneously believed that these accords
were based upon a historicallyWestern conception of rights and did not properly
reflect Islamic values.152 In some degree a response to these accords, the Cairo
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) was adopted in 1990 by the
forty-five member states of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).153
While claiming to complement the UDHR, many provisions may undermine
5&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
145 Status of the ICCPR, United Nations Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.
org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited
Oct. 12, 2014).
146 Bayefsky, supra note 137. “Only 60 complaints are registered annually from a potential
1.4 billion people.” Id. at 7. While this figure is from 2001, the vast majority of the parties to the
Optional Protocol for the ICCPR had already ratified it (all but twelve). Additionally, the figure is
a combination of the complaints lodged across four of the core human rights treaties that contain
individual complaint mechanisms.
147 Status of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, supra note 144.
148 Id. passim.
149 Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 33: The Obligations of States Parties un-
der the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 5, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (Nov. 5, 2008).
150 Id. ¶ 12.
151 Id. ¶ 14–15.
152 Jonathan Russell, Human Rights: The Universal Declaration vs The Cairo Declaration, Lon-
don Sch. Econ. & Pol. Sci.: Middle East Ctr. (Dec. 10, 2012), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/
2012/12/10/1569.
153 Id.
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rights guaranteed under the UDHR.154 For example, Article 22(a) states: “Every-
one shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not
be contrary to the principles of the Shari’ah.”155 Under such a rule, blasphemy
and public apostasy would likely have dire consequences—in contravention of
the UDHR and ICCPR.156
For this and other reasons, the CDHRI has been criticized.157 Fortunately,
steps have been made in the right direction with the recent creation of the Inde-
pendent Permanent Commission on Human Rights (IPHRC) in order to uphold
the values enshrined in the CDHRI.158 Positive aspects can be found in that the
IPHRC and its founding statute abandoned references to the Shari’ah, as well
as in the insistence that members be independent human rights experts. With
an expanding mandate, the potential thus remains to progress into a stronger
body where individual complaints may be heard, perhaps similar to that once
found in the European Commission on Human Rights.159 However, civil society
organizations also play a limited role and the review mechanism remains weak,
with the IPHRC publishing only thematic reports in place of country-specific
reports.160 In addition, the framework uses human rights “diplomacy,” rather
than “advocacy,” as other more stringent international systems use, and political
decisions keep the instrument from living up to its potential.161
3 Arab Charter on Human Rights
A separate organization to the OIC, the League of Arab States, came into being
in 1945.162 The Arab Charter on Human Rights was first adopted in 1994 and
contained provisions for the freedom to express opinions and religious beliefs in
Article 27.163 The document was criticized for a number of reasons, including
154 Id.
155 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, supra note 92, art. 22(a), translated in Transla-
tion of the CDHRI, supra note 92.
156 Public apostasy would of course overlap with the freedom of thought and religion guaranteed
under Article 18.
157 See Turan Kayaoğlu, It’s Time to Revise The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam,
Brookings Institution (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/
2012/04/23-cairo-kayaoglu (discussing some of the pitfalls of the CDHRI, such as how it is
too restrictive, too ambiguous, and empowers states instead of individuals).
158 Turan Kayaoğlu, A Rights Agenda for the Muslim World? The Organization of
Islamic Cooperation’s Evolving Human Rights Framework 3–4 (Brookings Doha Ctr. Anal-
ysis Paper No. 6, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2013/
1/08%20oic%20human%20rights%20kayaoglu/Turan%20Kayaoglu%20English.pdf.
159 Id. at 3; Turan Kayaoğlu, Human Rights Experts’ Recommendations to Inde-
pendent Permanent Human Rights Commission, Today’s Zaman (Nov. 10, 2013),
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-330895-human-rights-experts-recommendations-
to-independent-permanent-human-rights-commission.html.
160 Kayaoğlu, supra note 158, at 4.
161 Id.
162 Arab Charter on Human Rights, Humanrights.ch (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.
humanrights.ch/en/Standards/Other-Regions-Instruments/Arab-Charter-on-Human-
Rights/index.html.
163 Arab Charter on Human Rights, supra note 92, art. 27.
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lack of an enforcement mechanism.164 Of the twenty-two member states, only
Iraq signed the agreement, and no state ratified it.165
In 2004, a new version of the Charter was adopted, containing essentially
the same provisions for freedom of expression in Article 30.166 While the new
version introduced an enforcement mechanism, it remains very weak. State com-
pliance is monitored through reports given by the state to the seven-member ex-
pert Committee every three years after the initial report; in turn, the Committee
makes observations and recommendations.167 There is also no mechanism to
allow for petitions or complaints from states or individuals.168 The proposed
Arab Court of Human Rights also never came to be, although it is still being
discussed.169
4 Universal Periodic Review (UPR)
The review mechanism under the ICCPR is not the only international method
to measure the current condition of human rights in UN member states. The
Human Rights Council was established by the UN General Assembly in 2006 in
order to replace the controversial and widely criticized Human Rights Commis-
sion.170 Its creation included a mandate to perform a Universal Periodic Review
(UPR) of the “fulfilment by each State of its human rights obligations and com-
mitments.”171 This review is intended to complement and not duplicate other
human rights mechanisms, such as the one found in the ICCPR.172 One large
advantage of UPR over other mechanisms is that no specific treaty must be rat-
ified past the adoption of the UN Charter; all UN member states are subject to
review.
Reviews are conducted in Working Groups lasting three and a half hours
during which time only states can take the floor.173 States under review are
to present their national report and answer questions prepared in advance by
164 Al-Midani et al., supra note 92, at 148.
165 Press Release, Alkarma for Human Rights, Arab Charter on Human Rights: Written in 1994, It
is Enforced in 2008 (Mar. 21, 2008), http://en.alkarama.org/press-releases-k2/72-arab-
charter-on-human-rights-written-in-1994-it-is-enforced-in-2008.
166 Arab Charter onHuman Rights, supra note 92; seeAlkarma for Human Rights, supra note 165
(noting that it took four years to gain the seventh ratification in order to make the treaty binding).
167 See Alkarma for Human Rights, supra note 165.
168 Al-Midani et al., supra note 92.
169 League of Arab States: The Establishment of an Arab Court of Human Rights Must be Con-
sistent with Universal Standards, FIDH (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.fidh.org/International-
Federation-for-Human-Rights/north-africa-middle-east/league-of-arab-states/The-
establishment-of-an-Arab-Court-of-Human-Rights-must-be-consistent-with-13097.
170 See Philip Alston, Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the
New UN Human Rights Council, 7 Melb. J. Int’l L. 185, 191–93 (2006) (discussing the sources of
controversy and some of the contentious issues at the time); see also Carlos Villan Duran, Lights and
Shadows of the New United Nations Human Rights Council, Sur: Int’l J. on Hum. Rts., no. 5,
2006, at 6, 7 (noting that despite efforts to depoliticize the selection method of states serving on the
Council as compared with the Commission, it is doubtful these changes will be effective).
171 G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 5(e) (Mar. 15, 2006).
172 Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, U.N. Doc. A/62/53, at 51–52 (June 18, 2007).
173 Id.
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other states; however, only recommendations made orally by these states dur-
ing the interactive dialogue portion of the review are to be included in the re-
port.174 States under review are obligated to communicate their responses to the
recommendations in an addendum to the Council. They are to clearly specify
whether they accept or reject the recommendations.175 The Working Group re-
port is then revisited a few months later by the Human Rights Council plenary
session during an hour long adoption process, where states under review, other
states, and members of civil society (including non-governmental organizations
[NGOs] and other groups) are allotted twenty minutes each in order to address
concerns.176 This is the only time when members of civil society are able to take
the floor during the process.177 The entire procedure is then replicated every
four and a half years in order to monitor compliance with the recommendations
made during the previous review.178
The ability of the state under review to reject recommendations nullifiesmuch
of what UPRwas created to accomplish.179 The ability to pick and choose which
recommendations to honor effectively ensures the state will meet its goals for
each review. Even if a state were to ignore recommendations and refuse to com-
ply at all, the penalty is vague: “After exhausting all efforts to encourage a State
to cooperate with the universal periodic review mechanism, the Council will
address, as appropriate, cases of persistent non-cooperation with the mecha-
nism.”180
Even though UPR is a “cooperative” process with the state under scrutiny,181
there is limited input from stakeholders other than states. States under review
are only “encouraged” to prepare their reports with consultations from other
stakeholders, such as members and organizations of civil society.182
174 Id. at 50–52; State under Review Tutorial: Role of the State under Review at the UPR,
UPR Info, http://www.upr-info.org/sites/all/iframe/tutorials/State.php (last visited
Apr. 14, 2013).
175 Human Rights Council Res. 16/21, Review of the Work and Functioning of the Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/21, at 4 (Mar. 25, 2011). Giving states the benefit of the doubt,
there may be constitutional or practical concerns for the states under review to implement some of
the recommendations.
176 H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 172, at 52; H.R.C. Res. 16/21, supra note 175, at 4.
177 See H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 172, at 50–51. Civil society groups are able to submit re-
ports, in advance, which are then summarized by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights. Additionally, states under review, when preparing their own national report in anticipation
of the review, “are encouraged to prepare the information through a broad consultation process at
the national level with all relevant stakeholders.” Id. at 50. Overall, the review is based upon the
national report (up to twenty pages and is prepared by the state under review), the compilation of
UN information (up to ten pages and includes information on which treaties the states under review
are parties to which is prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), and
a summary of other stakeholders’ information (up to ten pages and includes information compiled
from various reports submitted by NGOs and other organizations).
178 H.R.C. Res. 16/21, supra note 175, at 3; see also H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 172, at 50 (“The
periodicity of the review for the first cycle will be of four years.”).
179 H.R.C. Res. 5/1, supra note 172, at 49. The first listed objective of the review is: “The im-
provement of the human rights situation on the ground.”
180 Id. at 53.
181 Id. at 52.
182 See id. at 50 (“States are encouraged to prepare the information through a broad consultation
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5 Room for Improvement
Reports on human rights by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and
the U.S. State Department have documented widespread violations in contraven-
tion of the ICCPR and other human rights treaties.183 The rise of the Internet
has made these violations more visible to both citizens of the state where the
violation occurred and abroad.184 This alone would warrant protection.
Critical legal minds have also pointed to the ineffectiveness of international
human rights agreements, going so far as to say, “the [ICCPR] treaty has no
self-enforcement or external enforcement mechanism.”185 It is then argued that
it is this low cost of ratification that induces widespread participation, including
that of many authoritarian regimes notorious for human rights violations.186
This is not to say that states completely disregard their obligations under these
agreements, but when they do comply with the terms of the treaty, it is attributed
to a “coincidence of interest.”187 Regardless of the validity of these claims, it is
obvious that, with the innate defects in the enforcement mechanisms of these
instruments, shortcomings will persist until they are addressed.
This situation creates a difficult arena for human rights to flourish. Author-
itarian regimes cannot be said to be an accurate representation of the people
over whom they rule. Additionally, it is not in authoritarian states’ best interest
to honor human rights provisions that allow dissidents to express themselves and
to organize. How then can these states be expected to police themselves? This
challenge becomes obvious as it becomes evident that the Internet is quickly be-
coming one of the prime mediums for the freedom of expression.
Keeping in mind related issues of Internet governance, this is yet another
example of why the multi-stakeholder approach is crucial in preserving rights
over the Internet. It is the people on the ground who are affected when human
rights are violated, oftentimes at the hands of the state (the same state appearing
before the review and pledging to increase human rights standards), which is
unfortunately the only voice usually heard during these review processes. This
situation is particularly true with the limiting of expression over the Internet—it
is the state that often has the ability to manipulate the Internet, and it is the state
that may in turn “discourage” individuals from posting content contrary to the
state’s interest. Allowing greater integration of civil society and other outside
bodies to participate in these mechanisms should be encouraged as they would
help provide oversight and keep states accountable.
Research has supported this hypothesis, showing that ratification of human
rights treaties is more beneficial to human rights when the state has stronger
process at the national level with all relevant stakeholders.”).
183 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 135, at 120. But see O’Connell, supra note 136, at ch. 3
(critiquing Goldsmith and Posner’s entire approach and understanding of international law).
184 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 135, at 121.
185 Id. at 127.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 111. In other words, states have reasons apart from human rights law for not committing
crimes against their populations—“the law does not supply the motivation.”
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civil society organizations, especially international NGOs.188 A similar positive
result has been related to the strength of democracy within a given state.189 Con-
versely, ratification of human rights treaties by authoritarian states with a weak
civil society has been shown to have no effect, or even a negative one.190 Other
studies have focused on the effects of globalization and economic freedom, in-
creases in which were only found to improve basic human rights (“physical in-
tegrity”) with no effect found upon empowerment rights (including the freedom
of speech).191 We must remember that the repression of expression over the In-
ternet may manifest through attacks on a person’s physical integrity, as seen in
the Khaled Said instance in Egypt and other examples discussed in Part III.
Under the current model, it is not realistic to expect the current paradigm
to change any time in the near future. States will forever be hesitant (to put it
mildly) to vote for a mechanism that will subject the state to true sanctions,
which in turn may be seen as an infringement on the states sovereignty or as a
loss in the amount of control they currently possess. This may be boiled down
to the problem that is created when states are the makers and the subjects of the
same law.192
While these international enforcement mechanisms might not have a direct,
immediate impact as intended, international law as a whole has been purported
to have numerous indirect benefits: It provides a common human rights lan-
guage, reinforces the universality of human rights, signals the consensus of the
international community, creates stigma for violators, creates increased expecta-
tions of compliance, encourages enforcement by international courts or agencies,
and encourages domestic judicial enforcement.193 On this last point, there is ev-
idence to suggest that international law is having an effect at the national level,
at least in some places. For instance, one researcher found references to 410
UN documents by U.S. domestic courts, twenty-eight percent of which were in
relation to international civil rights and six percent to domestic civil rights.194
At the very least, spreading awareness of these human rights issues is beneficial.
Mechanisms such as the UPR and others bring about awareness by encouraging
188 Eric Neumayer,Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?,
49 J. Conflict Resol. 925, 950 (2005).
189 Id.; see also Steven C. Poe et al., Repressions of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revis-
ited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993, 43 Int’l Stud. Q. 291, 310
(1999) (“[W]e found that past levels of repression, democracy, population size, economic develop-
ment, and international and civil wars are statistically and substantively significant determinants of
personal integrity abuse.”).
190 Neumayer, supra note 188, at 926.
191 Axel Dreher et al., Globalization, Economic Freedom, and Human Rights, 56 J. Conflict
Resol. 516, 538 (2012). It should also be noted that the authors found that “empowerment rights
rise with social globalization and economic freedom,” but observed that “these results are not robust
to the choice of control variables.” Id.
192 The same could be said for individuals.
193 Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make A Difference?, 2 Chi. J. Int’l
L. 121, 126–29 (2001).
194 Paul Hellyer, U.N. Documents in U.S. Case Law, 99 Law Libr. J. 73, 74 (2007). There are
likely many more than 410 cases—the author notes that the study only included opinions with
proper Bluebook citations and that this likely leaves out the majority of opinions that referenced
UN documents but which lacked proper Bluebook citations.
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the production of reports, not just by states, but by civil society as well, which
are then distributed on a wide scale.
B Trade Agreements
Apart from human rights agreements, trade agreements may also be used to pro-
tect human rights. It may seem a stretch to include human rights provisions into
bilateral or regional trade agreements, but it is not so far-fetched as it might
appear at first glance. Human rights have actually been at the center of such
agreements for some time.195 This can be seen with treaties signed in the nine-
teenth century to ban the trade in slaves, as well as the trade in goods manu-
factured by conflict labor.196 More recently, nations and communities, ranging
from the European Union to Brazil, have started to include human rights pro-
visions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs).197 These have increasingly be-
come commonplace, although they range in enforceability.198 They also range in
breadth—Canada and the United States tend to detail specific human rights that
are protected while the European Union includes universal human rights.199
While there are some benefits to human rights agreements, as noted above,
problems generally lie with the enforcement mechanisms. It may simply be the
result of the use of persuasion as opposed to coercion. Compliance with these
instruments typically requires a coercive mechanism to make the cost of non-
conformity outweigh the costs of keeping the status quo.200 The PTAs that have
“hard” mechanisms for the protection of human rights—ones that use coer-
cion—have parties that predictably honor their obligations at a higher rate than
those containing soft mechanisms using persuasion.201 Making the benefits of
the PTA conditional on human rights behaviors creates an economic and po-
litical incentive structure to promote reforms that may not otherwise be imple-
mented.202 Under this model, authoritarian states may still retain preferences for
195 Susan Ariel Aaronson & Jean Pierre Chauffour, The Wedding of Trade and Human Rights:
Marriage of Convenience or Permanent Match?, World Trade Org. (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.
wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr11_forum_e/wtr11_15feb11_e.htm.
196 Id. In the early nineteenth century, England signed treaties with the United States, Portugal,
Denmark, and Sweden to ban trading slaves; later in the nineteenth century, countries such as the
United States, England, Australia and Canada entered into agreements to ban goods resulting from
conflict labor.
197 Id.
198 Id. Many were at first non-binding, or still are as they may only be included in the preamble;
others are have methods of enforcement including dialogue, the use of dispute settlement bodies,
and possible suspension.
199 Id.
200 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influ-
ence Government Repression, 59 Int’l Org. 593, 596 (2005).
201 Id. at 597.ContraGabriele Spilker & Tobias Böhmelt, The Impact of Preferential Trade Agree-
ments on Governmental Repression Revisited, 8 Rev. Int’l Org. 343 (2013) (positing that PTAs
which include “hard” human rights mechanisms are unlikely to affect human rights compliance
when controlling for a selection problem, namely that states generally agree on “hard” human rights
mechanisms in PTAs only if they have a tendency to comply with human rights agreements in the
first place).
202 Hafner-Burton, supra note 200, at 595, 606.
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repression and be coerced into changing their policies.203 This stands in contrast
to persuasion, which needs ideas to become instilled before changes are made—
this obviously requires much more time.204 In the case where sanctions may be
used in place of withholding economic benefits, literature on economic bargain-
ing has suggested that sanctions are rarely utilized—threats are often sufficient
to coerce compliance.205 This avoids the costs related to sanctions for both the
sender and target.
For human rights provisions in multilateral treaties to be beneficial, there
needs to be an effective method of enforcement. Environmental provisions offer
an insightful parallel to the inclusion of human rights provisions in trade agree-
ments. Like human rights provisions, they are a fairly recent phenomenon as
there has been a marked increase in the number of provisions for protection of
environment included in trade agreements over recent decades. Without a hard
enforcement mechanism, these provisions may fall prey to the same inadequa-
cies apparent in the environmental provisions of some regional trade agreements
(RTAs) such as Mercosur, which have proved to be quite weak.206 These weak-
nesses in upholding the provisions are the result of weak national policies and
an inclination to not accept environmental provisions that are not already held
by a majority of the members. Mercosur’s environmental agency, the Working
Subgroup on the Environment (Sub-Grupo No. 6), also has a weak institutional
structure and a limited program—they have neither permanent agenda nor roles
except the general admonition to achieve the objective of the Treaty.207 Even
with a recent agreement intended to expand and specify the environmental aims
of Mercosur, there is little that can be done to resolve infractions of the environ-
mental provisions.208
The Internet is still in its infancy, and how it evolves remains to be seen.
However, in this short time, trade over the Internet has veritably exploded.209 As
203 Id. at 600.
204 Id.
205 Daniel W. Drezner, The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion, 57 Int’l Org. 643, 647 (2003).
206 Kathryn Hochstetler, Fading Green? Environmental Politics in the Mercosur Free Trade Agree-
ment, 45 Latin Am. Pol. & Soc’y, Winter 2003, at 1, 3.
207 Id. at 3–4, 13. This belies the fact that developing countries will try and limit trade-limiting en-
vironmental provisions. Brazil seems to have higher expectations to protect the environment, leading
to conflicts between some of the countries about how they can remain competitive with such struc-
tures in place; however, national environmental provisions have expanded in all the countries under
the Mercosur framework.
208 Id. at 13–14. The Environmental Framework Agreement in 2001 expanded and specified the
environmental aims of Mercosur, without actually achieving much. The agreement affirmed the
absence of an environmental dispute resolution mechanism—there is no regional court, and most
conflicts are resolved through direct negotiations between the respective presidents. No institution
has the ability to evaluate impacts on the environment, much less for transnational proposals. Much
of the working group’s time has been put towards investigating claims that environmental regula-
tions were being used as nontariff barriers in the region, thus relegating much of it solely to trade
promotion.
209 See Statistics and Data on Online Shopping, Statista, http://www.statista.com/topics/
871/online-shopping (last visited Dec. 26, 2012) (U.S. e-commerce sales grew from $72 billion
in 2002 to $256 billion in 2011); see also Melanie Lee, China’s online trade hits $45 billion in
Q2, Taobao Reigns: Report, Reuters (Oct. 16, 2012, 12:21 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
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trade will only continue to grow in prominence over the Internet with increasing
globalization, it then becomes not so unreasonable to suggest that provisions
for the protection of speech could be included in trade agreements. Sites like
YouTube earnmuch of their revenue through ad sales, which are dependent upon
the number of viewers. When states like Pakistan and China block YouTube,
there are millions of potential users lost before they even have the opportunity
to reach the site.210 This can translate into substantial lost revenue for both
YouTube and for the companies who advertise their products on YouTube.211
There is thus an economic incentive to coincide with the protection of freedom
of speech, among other human rights.
V Conclusion
A multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance would help retain a free
and open Internet for the future. Currently, there is no single body overseeing
Internet policy. The ITU aspires to fill this role, but Internet providers, mostly
in the United States, have blocked effective governance by that body. Neverthe-
less, greater ITU governance would be a top-down approach from states that
may merely give international force to the suppression of speech that is already
occurring. These repressive practices lead to human rights violations (and in
some cases are violations themselves) and have become commonplace across
the world, with some states and regions worse perpetrators than others. States
need to be held accountable for the violations occurring within their territory,
and methods exist within international law that may be used to put pressure on
states to change their practices.
There are numerous human rights-specific instruments used in order to keep
a watch upon state parties. These human rights agreements generally do not
live up to their potential, and there are ways in which they could be enhanced.
Stronger enforcement mechanisms andmore genuine input from civil society and
other stakeholders could improve upon the processes. For the time being, these
instruments have indirect benefits that pave the way for better mechanisms in
the future.
Trade agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, may also be used to put
pressure on states. “Hard” enforcement mechanisms, which withhold benefits or
impose sanctions, are more efficient at producing results than “soft”mechanisms
merely trying to persuade the states. Oftentimes, threats are sufficient to produce
positive results in human rights.
article/2012/10/16/net-us-china-ecommerce-idUSBRE89F06I20121016 (China’s growth has
been more recent: e-commerce only represented 4% of China’s retail sales in 2011, but the transac-
tion value jumped 30% to $925 billion over the past year, which is equivalent to 12.5% of China’s
gross domestic product).
210 See Pakistan Blocks Youtube, 20K Other Websites, supra note 64 (discussing how Pakistan
blocked YouTube and other sites for hosting “blasphemous” material); see also Emily Chang,
YouTube Blocked in China, CNN (Mar. 26, 2009, 12:48 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/
TECH/ptech/03/25/youtube.china (explaining how China routinely blocks material it finds po-
litically objectionable and how they initially blocked YouTube when riots were occurring in Tibet).
211 The latter is assuming the products are online or are capable of being shipped to the end user.
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There is still a lot of work to be done, and it is unlikely that the current regime
will rapidly change in the near future—incentives to positively modify the system
are largely lacking. With more awareness among civil society, constituents may
be able to play a larger and more effective role in keeping the Internet free and
in pressuring states into acting in accordance with international human rights
standards.
